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1 Introduction
Peoples ability to pay for the pharmaceuticals varies. As pharmaceutical products are created
through expensive R&D programs committing the pharmaceutical rms to rather high and risky
expenditures, those expenses should subsequently be covered by the product prices. Such prices,
however, may turn out to be too high to be socially acceptable. The policy stance as related to
the medical industry and expressed in o¢cial documents typically states that "the purpose of the
medical policy is to provide to citizens a high-quality and cost-e¢cient health program at reason-
able prices....". Moreover, "price regulation aims at providing peoples access to pharmaceutical
products at reasonable prices...".1
Previous work on the optimal price regulation of pharmaceutical products and health insurance
has produced a number of contributions. The basic idea is cast in terms of optimal product taxation
in one person or many person economy with Ramseys (1927) idea of equal percentage reductions in
(compensated) demands for all commodities (Diamond, 1975). Based on such foundations, Besley
(1988) explored the trade-o¤ between risk sharing and incentives to consume increased medical
care inherent in reimbursement insurance. Therefore, the price elasticity of demand appears to
play a key role (Ringel et al.). Earlier, Feldstein (1973) had expressed concerns of the welfare cost
of excess health insurance induced by the adverse incentives to increase the consumption of health
care. Determination of the pharmaceutical prices was considered as a strategic game between
the regulator and the pharmaceutical rms by Wright (2002) in a two-rm model with product
quality di¤erences. The economic case for patents and the potential for di¤erential pricing was
considered by Danzon and Towse (2003) in a multi-country framework. A multi-country case was
also introduced by Marinoso et al. (2011) who studied the price negotiations of a pharmaceutical
rm with two countries.
Two articles closely related to our work are Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2008) and Gaynor et
al. (2000). Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2008) addressed the interaction of pricing and insurance
coverage in the pharmaceutical market. Their paper assessed the normative allocation of R&D
costs across the di¤erent markets served by a pharmaceutical rm. They showed that higher
insurance coverage calls for higher prices not only because of lower demand elasticity but also due
to a larger moral hazard e¤ect on the consumption of the pharmaceuticals. The equilibrium pricing
rule appeared to di¤er from the standard Ramsey pricing rule: for equal demand elasticities, and
given the distortion cost of funds, a country with a higher coverage rate will have a higher price as
well. The paper by Gaynor et al. (2000) comes close to our approach, but their context is di¤erent
from ours. Their focus was in the excessive consumption of the pharmaceutical products caused
by the insurance, that is the moral hazard. While they worked with the case of a private insurance
market for health care, our focus is instead on the public insurance.
In a related area, Grassi and Ma (2011, 2012) studied the provision of public supply of health
care services but with non-price rationing when the income levels of people are di¤erent. They
showed, among other things, that if rationing is based on wealth information (as is the case in
the USA), the optimal policy must implement a price reduction in the private market. If also the
cost is observed, the optimal rationing turned out to be based on cost-e¤ectiveness (as in most
1Those quotations come from the o¢cial statements of Ministry of Social A¤airs and Health in our country.
Other countries with public health care have adopted similar policy lines.
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European countries and Canada).
Besides e¢ciency considerations, policy-makers also emphasize equitable access to services due
to the fact that in many countries, if not in most, low-income people are not able to buy the
medication they need. At least 14 countries in the European Union apply or have applied some
kind of third-degree price discrimination practices in their reimbursement systems (ISPOR 2013;
WHO 2013). Such countries include, among others, Germany, Austria, Spain, Great Britain,
France, and Italy among others. The most commonly used criteria have been income, social status
and age. Consequently, our analysis focuses on the di¤erent abilities to pay for the product by
individuals with di¤erent incomes.
To x the ideas of our paper, we consider the market for a pharmaceutical product with one
rm having innovated a new product. The rm is the sole producer of the product, say through
a patent protection. The cost of innovation is sunk at the time the product is sold in the market,
and it makes the average cost for the rm decreasing. We allow the consumer population to
be heterogeneus in terms of ability to pay (income) and analyze questions related to access to
pharmaceutical care. Our objective is to derive and analyze the optimal pricing and insurance
coverage by rst ignoring equity issues and, secondly, by directly dealing with the fact that a
non-trivial fraction of patients cannot a¤ord to buy phramaceutical products even at regulated
and subsidied market prices.
In the Finnish reimbursement system, for example, an equal access to reimbursed pharmaceuti-
cals is pursued by applying a maximum out-of-pocket payment ceiling (670e per calendar year per
patient) and means-tested subsistence subsidy to low income citizens. However, the recent Finnish
studies reveal that these practices do not guarantee that poor or socially disabled citizens get full
access to the pharmaceuticals they need. In a recent survey, the payment ceiling is considered too
high and people cannot necessarily purchase the prescribed pharmaceuticals (Kela, 2013). Strik-
ingly, 11 per cent of the Finnish population has abstained from buying medication because of the
prices they nd too high. Among those entitled to the sickness benet or the basic unemployment
compensation, the share is 24-36 per cent.2
Our approach incorporates the R&D cost of the product into the optimal pricing. As the
equality between the marginal cost of production and the marginal revenue does not represent a
feasible starting point for price regulation, we rst characterize the Ramsey pricing rule in the
absence of insurance coverage. Subsequently, conditions for a welfare increasing departure from
Ramsey pricing in terms of price regulation and optimal coverage are derived taking the social cost
of taxation into account. The resulting outcome is second best in general. The results provide
insight as to why both the price regulation and the social insurance are desirable.3 Arising from the
decreasing average cost of the rm and its pricing power4, a social cost-benet analysis is needed to
capture both the social welfare gains from price regulation and public health insurance as well as
2There is another dimension of inequity in the health policy. In Finland, for example, the access to the health
services is uneven in that the working population has an easy access to the occupational health care while the
non-working population is serviced in the public health centers subject of a prolonged queuing (Doorslaer 2013).
3These issues are related to the discussion on the value-based pricing in health economics.
4The sunk cost of R&D is very large making the average cost decreasing. Thus, the marginal cost pricing is not
feasible. However, the xed cost of production is low and thereby the rm does not make up a natural monopoly.
Under the Ransey-pricing, the rm is allowed the access to pricing where its costs are covered but it is subject of
the zero-prot condition.
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the social costs in terms of the cost of public funds. We notice that the public insurance approach
in our model solves automatically the potential adverse selection problem by the patients.
While most previous papers have abstracted from patients with low ability to pay for the
pharmaceutical products, we extend our analysis to the case of the socially optimal third-degree
price discrimination. We suggest how the health of low income people can be valued in the social
cost-benet analysis. The approach leads to studying an equilibrium where patients with low
ability to pay have access to the full coverage while patients with high ability to pay have partial
coverage. The results are informative as to how the cost-e¤ectiveness analysis should be used in
price regulation and in the creation of the insurance coverage. It turns out, for example, that in
case of a high-quality drug, the optimal coverage for high-ability individuals approaches zero while
the low-ability individuals have the full coverage.
Our paper has the following structure. We introduce the model in Section 2. Section 3 formu-
lates the basic problem to be analyzed in di¤erent forms throughout the paper. Section 4 derives
the Ramsey prices and Section 5 analyzes the optimal prices together with the endogenously de-
termined insurance coverage. Such policy is called price-insurance policy. Section 6 examines the
insurance mechanisms ensuring pharmaceutical consumption for all consumers independently of
their ability to pay. Section 7 discusses the ndings and concludes. A technical appendix follows.
2 Model
We consider a market for a new pharmaceutical product. There is a single monopoly producer
holding a patent to sell the product. The size of the consumer population is normalized to one.
The fraction ° of the consumers is ill and in need of the pharmaceutical treatment. We assume
throughout the article that ° = 1, and that all consumers can be treated as patients. If a patient
consumes the pharmaceutical, the product helps to recover health and ability to work.
2.1 Ability to pay, consumer surplus and demand
Each patient consumes regular commodities and at most one unit of the medication. It is the
key ingredient of our approach that patients are heterogeneous in their ability to pay for the
pharmaceutical. We introduce a randomly distributed income variable W , which is assumed to
follow the U [0; 1] distribution. The small letter w denotes the realization of the income variable.
The income variable measures the disposable income and hence includes patients tax payments to
the government. The state of a patients health is either high or low with corresponding utilities
uH(s) > uL, depending whether or not the consumer consumes the pharmaceutical. The parameter
s measures the quality of the pharmaceutical product. The better is the quality of the product, the
better o¤ is a healthy consumer but at a decreasing rate, ie. @uH(s)=@s > 0; @2uH(s)=@s2 < 0:5
We rst show how willingness to pay for the pharmaceutical product, denoted µ, is determined
by patients ability to pay and the quality of the pharmaceutical using the approach developed
in Grassi and Ma (2011, 2012). We rst introduce the following price structure: the variables P
and pc denote the price of the (composite of the) consumption goods and the consumer price of
5 In the current paper, the quality s is exogenous. We, however, acknowledge the possibility that the price
regulation may have implications for the quality of the pharmaceutical.
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the pharmaceutical product, respectively. Let x ¸ 0 denote the amount of the consumption good
consumed. The budget constraint of a patient with income w can be written as w = Px + ipc,
where the binary variable i = 1; 0 depending whether or not the patient buys the pharmaceutical.
For simplicity, we adopt the normalization P = 1 in the following analysis. Assuming a separable
utility function and introducing a minor generalization to Grassi and Ma (2011, 2012), the patient
obtains indirect utility
u(w ¡ pc) + uH(s) (1)
by consuming the pharmaceutical product. The utility function u(x) is assumed to be strictly
increasing and concave in x. If the pharmaceutical product is not consumed, the patients indirect
utility is
u(w) + uL: (2)
The willingness to pay for the pharmaceutical product µ for the patient with income w is now
determined by the indi¤erence condition
u(w ¡ µ) + uH(s) = u(w) + uL: (3)
Stated more intuitively, the health benet due to the consumption of the pharmaceutical equals
the utility sacrice in terms of foregone consumption of the regular good, that is
uH(s) ¡ uL = u(w) ¡ u(w ¡ µ): (4)
The above condition denes implicitly the willingness to pay as a function of income and the
quality of the pharmaceutical. The willingness to pay is increasing in income and the quality of
the pharmaceutical, because the implicit di¤erentiation of the condition (4) yields
@µ
@w
=
¡[u0(w) ¡ u0(w ¡ µ)]
u0(w ¡ µ) > 0;
@µ
@s
=
@uH(s)=@s
u0(w ¡ µ) > 0: (5)
Given the price pc, patients with willingness to pay satisfying µ ¸ pc buy the pharmaceutical
product while those with µ < pc abstain from buying. The former group creates the demand for
the pharmaceutical product. For the latter group, the sacrice is too high in terms of the foregone
consumption of the regular goods. We can thus dene the low-income patients in our model as
those with ability to pay so low that that they abstain from buying the pharmaceutical. With the
consumer price pc, the consumer surplus for buying patients is given by CS(1) = µ ¡ pc. Those
patients with positive consumer surplus have uH(s) as their utility from health. For the marginal
patient who is indi¤erent between buying and not buying the pharmaceutical, the consumer surplus
is zero. Those patients, who abstain from consuming the pharmaceutical, have uL as their utility
from health.
In the above analysis, the willingness to pay µ(w; s) has been regarded as an endogenous variable
determined by income and the quality of the pharmaceutical. A natural parametrization applied
in the following analysis is given by
µ(w; s) = ws: (6)
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It can be shown that this parametrisation (6) is consistent with the general approach presented
above. Setting uL = 0, adopting the logarithmic specication u(x) = ln(x) for the utility of the
consumption goods and uH(s) = ¡ ln(1¡ s) for the valuation of quality levels s < 1, the condition
(4) can be rewritten as
ln (w ¡ µ) ¡ ln(1 ¡ s) = ln(w) (7)
The parametrisation (6) can be obtained by solving the above condition with respect to µ:6
In what follows, we assume conditions which allow us to derive the parametrisation (6). Then,
a patient with income w obtains a surplus
CS(1) = ws¡ pc; (8)
if she consumes pharmaceutical and zero surplus CS(0) = 0 otherwise. In what follows, the variable
p denotes the producer price of the pharmaceutical product and r the insurance coverage. The
consumer price is then given as pc = (1 ¡ r) p. For the indi¤erent (marginal) patient with income
wm, the equality
wms¡ (1 ¡ r)p = 0 (9)
holds true. The equation (9) can be solved with respect to wm to obtain
wm =
(1 ¡ r)p
s
: (10)
Assuming wm < 1, those patients with incomes lower than wm do not buy the pharmaceutical while
the patients with incomes higher than wm buy. If the price of the pharmaceutical is su¢ciently
high, all patients prefer not to consume the pharmaceutical. This occurs when the condition
p(1 ¡ r) > s holds true.
The demand for the pharmaceutical product is the amount of buying patients:
q(p; r) = 1 ¡wm = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ r)ps : (11)
Thus, the inverse market demand function is given as
p =
s
1 ¡ r (1 ¡ q) : (12)
For the intuition, this demand function is consistent with the idea that the product is a normal
good with positive income elasticity. The consumers are ordered on the declining (linear) demand
function in regard to their ability to pay. We also notice that an increase in the insurance coverage
moves the demand function right.
6We thank Albert Ma for pointing out the solution and utility specication to us.
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2.2 Producer
The prot of the pharmaceutical rm is dened as follows
¼ = (p¡ c)q(p; r) ¡ F; (13)
where c > 0 is the marginal cost of production and F > 0 is a xed (sunk) cost from R&D activities
prior to the launch of the pharmaceutical. In order to have an active market, we assume throughout
the article that the quality of the pharmaceutical exceeds the marginal cost of production:
Assumption 1 0 < c < s:
If we did not make Assumption 1, there would be no patients whose willingness to pay for the
pharmaceutical exceeds the marginal cost of producing the pharmaceutical, and hence there would
be no room for market exchange.
In addition, to ensure a positive monopoly prot, we assume the condition
Assumption 2 0 < F < (s¡c)
2
4s
to hold true. Assumption 2 ensures that there are prices on the demand curve, which exceed the
average cost of production. Assumption 2 ensures that there are regulatory policies satisfying the
rms participation constraint
¼ ¸ 0:
2.3 Regulator
The regulator is benevolent and searches for the producer price and insurance coverage which
maximize the social welfare. It is dened as the sum of the consumer surplus and the rms prot
net of the cost of nancing the health insurance
W = CS + ¼ ¡ (1 + ¸)T: (14)
Here T is the tax revenue collected to nance the health insurance. We assume that each euro
raised through taxes to nance the pharmaceutical consumption costs (1+¸) for the society where
¸ ¸ 0 measures the social cost of public funds. The regulator maximizes social welfare subject to
the budget constraint
T ¸ rpq(p; r): (15)
The right-hand side of equation (15) measures the insurance expenditure due to the consumption
of the pharmaceuticals.
2.4 Timing
We will examine a strategic game between the regulator and the producer of the pharmaceutical.
The sequence of moves is as follows. The regulator rst chooses the producer price p and insurance
coverage r, after which the rm either accepts or rejects the proposal. If the rm accepts the
proposal, patients decide whether or not to acquire the pharmaceutical.7
7The regulator acts as a Stackelberg leader relative to the producer and the consumers.
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3 Setting up the problem
Since all patients with income higher than [p(1¡r)]=s consume the pharmaceutical8 , their number
can be computed as follows
q(p; r) =
1Z
p(1¡r)
s
dw = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ r)p
s
: (16)
The consumer surplus arising from the consumption of pharmaceuticals is then given as
CS(p; r) =
1Z
p(1¡r)
s
(ws¡ (1 ¡ r) p) dw: (17)
On the other hand, the rms prot can be dened as follows:
¼(p; r) = (p ¡ c)
1Z
p(1¡r)
s
dw ¡ F = (p¡ c)q(p; r) ¡ F: (18)
It is worth observing that one part of the rms revenue is paid by the patients and the other part
reimbursed by the health insurance. Hence, we can decompose the prot into two parts,
¼(p; r) = (1 ¡ r)p
1Z
p(1¡r)
s
dw + rp
1Z
p(1¡r)
s
dw ¡ c
1Z
p(1¡r)
s
dw ¡ F (19)
= (1 ¡ r)pq(p; r) + rpq(p; r) ¡ cq(p; r) ¡ F: (20)
In equation (20), (1 ¡ r)pq(p; r) is the revenue that the rm earns from the patients out-of-pocket
payments and rpq(p; r) is the payment that the rm collects from the insurer. In the case of the
social insurance, the latter payment is rst collected as a tax from the citizens (including patients)
and then transferred to the rm as a subsidy.
The aggregate insurance expenditure thereby amounts to
IE(p; r) = rp
1Z
p(1¡r)
s
dw = rpq(p; r): (21)
Note that IE(p; 0) = 0. Since the value of the social welfare function decreases strictly as tax
revenue T increases, the regulator is not willing to collect more tax revenue than the amount of
the aggregate insurance expenditure. This implies that the budget constraint (15) must be binding
8 In the later section, we examine the policy under which also those with low ability to pay are eligible of the
coverage.
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at any solution of the regulators problem. The social welfare function can then be restated as
follows:
W = CS(p; r) + ¼(p; r) ¡ (1 + ¸)IE(p; r): (22)
The regulator chooses the price-insurance policy (p; r) which maximizes the value of the social
welfare (22) subject to the prot constraint
¼(p; r) ¸ 0 (23)
and feasibility constraints
p ¸ 0 (24)
and
0 · r · 1: (25)
Throughout the article, we will analyze a relaxed problem in which social welfare is maximized
without the feasibility constraints. After solving the problem we then check whether the obtained
solution satises the constraints (24) and (25). This approach has become a standard analytical
tool in the principal-agent literature (see e.g. Martimort and La¤ont, 2002).
As an e¢cient benchmark for the regulators problem, we use the rst-best price and quantity
which maximize the social welfare not inuenced by insurance coverage:
Wf = CS(p; 0) + ¼(p; 0): (26)
In the rst-best solution, the price equals the marginal cost, pf = c. The amount of pharmaceuticals
consumed at the rst-best solution is q(c; 0) = 1 ¡ (c=s). The corresponding value of the social
welfare is
¹Wf = CS(pf ; 0) + ¼(pf ; 0) =
(s¡ c)2
2s
¡ F: (27)
It is also known that the regulator can not implement the marginal-cost pricing because the rm
will reject such proposals. If marginal-cost pricing were applied the rm would earn the prot
¡F , and the pricing scheme would not satisfy the rms prot constraint. Our main objective in
this article is to examine and assess the potential solutions to this problem with and without an
insurance coverage.
4 Ramsey prices
We rst consider the situation in which the society decides not to subsidize the patients pharma-
ceutical expenditures selecting r = 0. Then, the consumption of the pharmaceutical has no e¤ect
on public expenditures and there is no need to fund social insurance through tax collection. Note,
however, that the problem of covering the rms xed R&D cost still remains.
The problem of the regulator can be dened as nding the price of the pharmaceutical which
maximizes the social welfare
8
W = CS(p; 0) + ¼(p; 0) (28)
subject to the prot constraint
¼(p; 0) ¸ 0: (29)
This is the problem of nding the Ramsey prices. With L denoting the value of the Lagrangean
function, the necessary condition of the regulators problem can be dened as follows
@L
@p
=
@CS(p; 0)
@p
+ (1 + ¹)
@¼(p; 0)
@p
= ¡
³
1 ¡ p
s
´
+ (1 + ¹)
·³
1 ¡ p
s
´
¡ (p ¡ c)
s
¸
= 0; (30)
where ¹ is the positive-valued Lagrange multiplier of the prot constraint. In addition to the
condition (30), the prot constraint and the complementary slackness conditions require that
¡¼(p; 0) · 0; ¹ ¸ 0 and ¡¹¼(p; 0) = 0.
It is now straightforward to establish that the prot of the rm must be zero in the solution
of the regulators problem. Suppose this is not the case and p^ solves the regulators problem
but ¡¼(p^; 0) < 0. Then ¹^ = 0, and the rst-order condition (30) yields p^ = c. Marginal-cost
pricing can not solve the regulators problem, because the rms prot is strictly negative. This
contradiction implies that the rm must earn normal (zero) prot in the solution of the regulators
problem.
The rst-order condition (30) can be rearranged as follows:
p¡ c
p
=
¹
1 + ¹
s¡ p
p
(31)
This condition together with the zero-prot condition
F ¡ (p¡ c)
³
1 ¡ p
s
´
= 0 (32)
yields9 the Ramsey price
pR =
1
2
h
s+ c¡
p
(s¡ c)2 ¡ 4sF
i
<
1
2
(s+ c) ´ pM : (33)
where (1=2)(s+c) = argmaxp(p¡c)(1=s)(s¡p)¡F is the monopoly price. It is worth pointing out
that the Assumption 2 ensures that the Ramsey price is well-dened. The value of the Lagrange
multiplier at the regulators solution is
¹R =
pR ¡ c
s¡ 2pR + c > 0: (34)
9The system of equations (32) and (31) has two solutions r1 = (p1; ¹1) and r2 = (p2; ¹2): The rst (second,
respectively) solution corresponds to the lower (higher) root of the zero prot condition. The value of social welfare
is strictly decreasing at all price levels exceeding marginal cost. Since the prices in the feasible set (ie. prices which
satisfy the prot constraint) all exceed the marginal cost, the lower root r1 is the solution of the regulators problem.
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Intuitively, the Ramsey price is su¢ciently high so as to make the rm break even but it is
lower than the monopoly price. We also notice that the Ramsey price is related not only to the
marginal or the xed R&D costs but also to the demand elasticity through the quality parameter
s. The absolute value of the price elasticity of demand in our model is
j²pj ´
¯¯¯¯
@q(p; 0)
@p
p
q(p; 0)
¯¯¯¯
=
p
s¡ p: (35)
The above equation for demand elasticity suggests that the higher quality of the drug implies a
less elastic demand which then should lead to a higher Ramsey price according to the arguments
usually presented about Ramsey prices. However, in the context of our model, an increase in the
quality of the pharmaceutical shifts the whole demand curve to the right and the Ramsey price
needs to be reduced in order for the zero prot condition to be satised in a new equilibrium with
a higher quality. Therefore, an increase in the quality of the pharmaceutical reduces Ramsey price,
which can also be veried by di¤erentiating the expression (33) with respect to quality parameter.
The rm earns zero prot at the Ramsey solution and, hence, the maximum social welfare
equals the equilibrium value of the consumer surplus. The maximum social welfare is given as
WR = CS(pR; 0) =
1
2s
(s¡ pR)2 = 1
8s
³
s¡ c+
p
(s¡ c)2 ¡ 4sF
´2
: (36)
We notice from the Ramsey price that it even if it eliminates excess prots, it forcefully limits
the number of people who are able to buy the pharmaceutical product when in need. In the next
section, we turn to consider a tax-nanced social insurance program and its possibilities to enhance
social welfare.
5 Second-best e¢cient pricing and insurance coverage
We then introduce health insurance and ask whether adding a distortionary instrument to the
regulators strategy set improves welfare. It is worth observing at this point that our analysis
contains the cases of costless taxation, ¸ = 0, and costly taxation, that is ¸ > 0. Whether
taxation is costless or costly for society has crucial implications for the e¢ciency of the optimal
price-insurance policy. We rst derive the optimal solution and then assess the welfare properties
of it.
As above, we let L to denote the value of the Lagrangean function. The interior solution of the
relaxed problem must satisfy the following rst-order conditions:
@L
@p
=
@CS(p; r)
@p
+ (1 + ¹)
@¼(p; r)
@p
¡ (1 + ¸) @IE(p; r)
@p
= 0 (37)
and
@L
@r
=
@CS(p; r)
@r
+ (1 + ¹)
@¼(p; r)
@r
¡ (1 + ¸) @IE(p; r)
@r
= 0: (38)
In addition, the solution of the relaxed problem must satisfy the feasibility and complementary
slackness conditions ¡¼(p; r) · 0, ¹ ¸ 0 and ¡¼(p; r)¹ = 0:
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The solution to the regulators problem is presented in Proposition 1. A general feature of the
solution is that the value of the Lagrangian multiplier must equal the social cost of public funds
and ~¹ = ¸ ¸ 0. To explain intuitively this result, we notice that the multiplier ¹ measures the
marginal social benet of relaxing the prot constraint of the pharmaceutical rm. It is part of
the optimal solution that this benet equals the marginal social cost of generating public funds,
¸. The following proposition characterizes the optimal price-insurance policy.
Proposition 1. If ¸ ¸ 0 and
(s¡ c)2¸(1 + ¸)
s(1 + 2¸)2
< F <
(s¡ c)2
4s
(39)
the optimal price-insurance policy is
~p = c+
sF (1 + 2¸)
(s¡ c)(1 + ¸) (40)
and
~r =
sF (1 + 2¸)2 ¡ (s¡ c)2¸(1 + ¸)
(1 + 2¸) [sF + c(s¡ c) + ¸(2sF + c(s¡ c))] : (41)
Proof. See Appendix.
In the optimal policy, the producer price ~p exceeds the marginal cost c in order to cover the
xed R&D costs. The optimal price-insurance policy (~p; ~r) is designed in a way that it gives the
normal prot for the rm. It is also worth noticing that the optimal price is increasing (and
concave) in the social cost of public funds ¸.
The condition (39) guarantees that ~r > 0 and the optimal policy is an interior solution. If the
condition was not satised, the necessary conditions of the problem would support the Ramsey
solution ~r = 0 and ~p = pR analyzed in Section 410 . Furthermore, it can be shown that the e¤ect
of the xed cost on the optimal insurance coverage is given as follows:
@~r
@F
=
(s¡ c)s(1 + ¸) [s¸+ c(1 + ¸)]
[(s¡ c)c(1 + ¸) + Fs(1 + 2¸)]2 > 0:
Intuitively, these two observations suggest that the regulator is more likely to use health insurance
and to increase the insurance coverage, the higher is the xed cost F . The active use of insurance
reimbursement allows the regulator to reduce out-of-pocket payments and enhance social welfare.
If health insurance was not available, an increase in the xed cost would increase the price of the
pharmaceutical and reduce consumer surplus and social welfare. In other words, the introduction
of health insurance improves the regulators possibilities to meet its policy objectives.
We then evaluate the consumer surplus, the insurance expenditure and the social welfare at
the optimal price-insurance policy displayed in Proposition 1. The price that patients pay out of
their own pockets is
10This analysis is available from the authors.
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~p(1 ¡ ~r) = c+ (s¡ c)¸
(1 + 2¸)
¸ c; (42)
where the equality holds true when taxation is costless and ¸ = 0. When taxation is distortionary
and ¸ > 0, the consumer price is strictly above the marginal cost of producing pharmaceuticals.
From these observations it naturally follows that the demand for the pharmaceuticals is in general
below the rst-best level and
q(~p; ~r) =
(s¡ c)(1 + ¸)
s(1 + 2¸)
· s¡ c
s
= q(c; 0): (43)
When evaluated at the optimal price-insurance pair, the consumer surplus is
CS(~p; ~r) =
(s¡ c)2
2s
µ
1 + ¸
1 + 2¸
¶2
· (s¡ c)
2
2s
= CS(c; 0): (44)
The consumer surplus is also lower than the consumer surplus, which patients would enjoy by
paying the e¢cient price and receiving no insurance coverage.
The insurance expenditure or the reimbursement at the optimal solution is given as
IE(~p; ~r) = ¡ (s¡ c)
2¸ (1 + ¸)
s (1 + 2¸)2
+ F: (45)
The insurance expenditure is positive in the interior solution and, furthermore, we notice that,
in the case of distortionary taxation, the expenditure is less than the xed cost. On the other
hand, if ¸ = 0, the insurance reimbursement equals the xed cost at the optimal solution. The
intuition behind this relationship between the optimal insurance reimbursement and the social cost
of public funds is as follows: the higher is ¸, the less (more, respectively) willing is the regulator to
use taxation (patients out-of-pocket payments, respectively) as a means to nance the xed cost
of producing pharmaceuticals.
Recalling that the rm earns zero prot at the solution, the maximum value of the social welfare
simplies to
~W =
(s¡ c)2
2s
(1 + ¸)2
(1 + 2¸)
¡ F (1 + ¸) : (46)
The consumer surplus is below the rst-best consumer surplus at the optimal price-insurance
policy, but the insurance expenditure is less than the xed cost (see Eq. 45). Hence, it is not
immediately clear that the maximum welfare (46) is less than the e¢cient social welfare (26).
However, Proposition 2 below demonstrates that, because of the positive social cost of public
funds, rst-best welfare exceeds the welfare at the optimal price-insurance policy (46).
It is also interesting to compare the maximum social welfare from the optimal price-insurance
policy with costly taxation (46) with the maximum social welfare obtained from the Ramsey
solution (36). This allows us to evaluate the welfare consequences of the health insurance in
a setting where the benchmark case with no health insurance is not the rst-best allocation.
Compared with the Ramsey solution, the introduction of the insurance coverage separates the
12
producer and consumer prices from each other, induces patients to consume more pharmaceuticals
and allows the regulator to design policies which satisfy the rms prot constraint. In comparison
to the Ramsey solution, the optimal price-insurance policy (~p; ~r) increases the consumer surplus
by reducing the consumer price below the Ramsey price (33). The obvious cost of introducing
the social health insurance is that it increases public expenditures. Social insurance improves
welfare if the gain in consumer surplus exceeds the corresponding increase in public expenditures.
Proposition 2 proves that this indeed is the case.
Proposition 2. The welfare ranking between the rst-best solution, the Ramsey solution and the
optimal price-insurance policy is the following:
¹Wf ¸ ~W ¸ WR: (47)
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, the Ramsey solution produces smaller welfare than the optimal price-insurance,
because a great many people are not able to acquire the drug at Ramsey prices. The optimal
policy (~p; ~r), however, does not reach the e¢cient solution because of the social cost of public
funds.
6 Rawlsian approach
6.1 Third-degree price discrimination and quality of drugs
The previous analysis on the optimal price-insurance policy demonstrates how the introduction of
health insurance can improve the e¢ciency of the pharmaceutical market in comparison with the
situation where no health insurance is available. From the equity point of view, however, the policy
has a serious limitation. The out-of-pocket payment exceeds the marginal cost, and the patients
in the cohort of the lowest incomes cannot a¤ord to buy the pharmaceutical even though in the
presence of health insurance. The number of such patients is 1 ¡ q(~p; ~r) > 0. Health is, however,
not like any other product, and equity considerations suggest that patients with limited ability to
pay should also have access to the pharmaceutical treatment.
Our objective in this section is to examine whether the welfare criterion could be adjusted to
cope with equity. We introduce a Rawlsian principle of equity into the health insurance in the form
of the third-degree price discrimination. This amounts to analyzing a model where people with
high ability to pay and people with low ability to pay are entitled to di¤erent coverage rates, say
r1 · r2, where subscripts 1 and 2 refer to high-ability to pay (high-income) and low-ability to pay
(low-income) patients, respectively. In particular, in what follows we will focus on a price-insurance
mechanism (p; r1; r2) with the feature r1 · r2 = 1. Under this mechanism, the regulator chooses
the same price for all patients, selects the value of insurance coverage for high-income patients,
and allocates the pharmaceutical to the patients with a low ability to pay for free. It is worth
observing that the number of patients within these two groups is determined endogenously on the
basis of the policy parameters (p; r1; 1).11
11There are good reasons for considering the full insurance coverage for low-income patients. If the insurance
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In order to dene the welfare of the low-ability patients, we study two compelementary criteria.
The rst criterion is a subjective one and based on the consumer surplus of low-income patients.
The second criterion is socially determined and is based on the value of life and the ability of low-
income patients to work. We will analyze the rst criterion in this section and delay the analysis
of the second criterion until the next subsection.
With full insurance coverage, the consumer surplus of the low-income patients is determined
in a manner which is analogous to that of the high-income patients. Given the price-insurance
mechanism (p; r1; 1), the consumer surplus of the low-income patients is
Z p(1¡r1)
s
0
wsdw:
The aggregate consumer surplus is thus given as follows:
CS(p; r1; 1) =
Z p(1¡r1)
s
0
wsdw +
1Z
p(1¡r1)
s
(ws¡ (1 ¡ r1) p) dw: (48)
All patients purchase the pharmaceutical under this mechanism, because the aggregate demand is
q(p; r1; 1) =
p(1 ¡ r1)
s
+ 1 ¡ p(1 ¡ r1)
s
= 1:
This implies that the rms prot
¼(p; r1; 1) = p ¡ c¡ F; (49)
is now independent of the insurance coverage. The total insurance expenditure consists of the
insurance reimbursements paid to the high- and low-income patients
IE(p; r1; 1) =
p2(1 ¡ r1)
s
+ r1p
µ
1 ¡ p(1 ¡ r1)
s
¶
: (50)
The following analysis concentrates on the case of costly taxation only, which is also the approach
used in the literature (Barros and Martinez-Xiralt, 2008). The optimal equity-adjusted price-
insurance mechanism based on the subjective welfare criterion is characterized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. If ¸ > 0 and c+F > s=2, the equity-adjusted optimal price-insurance policy with
the subjective criterion is
p^ = c+ F (51)
and
coverage were not full, there would be a patient at the lowest end of the income distribution who would not be able
to acquire the pharmaceutical. We note that many European countries have developed instruments to provide free
medication for low-income individuals.
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r^1 = 1 ¡ s
2(c+ F )
: (52)
Proof. See Appendix.
In the optimal price-insurance policy described in Proposition 3, the high-income patients are
entitled to partial coverage while the low-income patients obtain the medication with full coverage.
The quality of the drug a¤ects the optimal insurance coverage in an interesting way. In particular,
the higher is the quality of the pharmaceutical, the lower is the optimal insurance coverage for
high-income patients.
These results may appear counterintuitive, but the logic goes as follows. If the quality of the
pharmaceutical is high, the wealthy patients are willing to pay more for the pharmaceutical prod-
uct, and our results suggest that the regulator takes this into account by adjusting the insurance
coverage accordingly. This feature is not unique to the Rawlsian mechanism described above, but
as the analysis of the optimal price-insurance mechanism in Section 5 shows, the out-of-pocket
payment of buying patients (see Eq. 42) is also increasing in the quality of the pharmaceutical.
The welfare properties of the optimal solution make some of these points explicit. The out-of-
pocket payment for high-income patients is
p^(1 ¡ r^1) = s
2
(53)
and these patients demand for the pharmaceutical is
q(p^; r^1; 1) =
µ
1 ¡ p^(1 ¡ r^1)
s
¶
=
1
2
: (54)
Another half of the market consists of the consumption of low-income patients. Equal division of the
market shows up also in the consumer surplus that the two groups obtain from the consumption of
the pharmaceutical. The aggregate consumer surplus that patients obtain from the optimal policy
(p^; r^1; 1) is
CS(p^; r^1; 1) =
s
4
; (55)
which is split equally between the high- and low-income patients. Hence, and somewhat strikingly,
although the patients with low ability to pay obtain the pharmaceutical for free, their surplus at
the optimal solution is no higher than the surplus of the patients with high ability to pay.
When evaluated at the optimal solution (p^; r^1; 1), the aggregate insurance expenditure amounts
to
IE(p^; r^1; 1) = c+ F ¡ s
4
: (56)
The insurance expenditure due to the consumption of the high-income patients is
r^1p^
µ
1 ¡ p^(1 ¡ r^1)
s
¶
=
1
2
(c+ F ) ¡ s
4
: (57)
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It is worth pointing out that the aggregate insurance expenditure and the insurance expenditure of
the high-income patients are strictly positive under the assumption s < 2(c+F ), which ensures the
interior solution (see Proposition 3). Finally, the insurance expenditure due to the consumption
of low-income patients is
p^2(1 ¡ r^1)
s
=
1
2
(c+ F ); (58)
which is strictly positive. As expected, the low-income group of patients is more expensive for the
regulator in terms of their insurance expenditure. The higher is the quality of the pharmaceutical
s, the lower is the aggregate insurance reimbursement paid for the high-income patients. Such a
relationship arises because the optimal insurance coverage of the high-income patients decreases as
the quality of the pharmaceutical increases and a larger share of the total price p^ is paid directly
by the high-income patients.
The social welfare in the Rawlsian solution with the subjective criterion is given as
W^ =
s
4
¡ (1 + ¸)(c+ F ¡ s
4
): (59)
We next compare the welfare obtained from the above policy paying explicit attention for equity
with the welfare obtained from the optimal price-insurance policy with no concern for the access
of low-income patients (Section 5). We address the question whether adjusting the optimal policy
for the patients ability to pay improves the social welfare. The following proposition shows that
this is possible and occurs when the quality of the pharmaceutical is su¢ciently high.
Proposition 4. Suppose that ¸ > 0. Then the equity-adjusted price-insurance policy (p^; r^1; 1) with
a subjective welfare criterion produces higher welfare than the optimal price-insurance policy (~p; ~r)
with no equity concern and W^ ¸ ~W , if
s ¸ 2c(1 + ¸)
Ã
1 +
r
1 +
1
2¸
!
: (60)
Proof. See Appendix.
Stated verbally, under the Rawlsian criterion, the social welfare exceeds the social welfare under
an optimal price-insurance policy with a uniform coverage rate. This result is, however, conditional
on the quality of the drug. When the quality is high enough, the high-income people are willing to
pay for the consumption of the pharmaceutical by themselves which limits the social cost of public
funds needed to deliver the drug to all patients.
6.2 A social criterion
While the consumer surplus, based on the subjective valuation of those with su¢ciently high
ability to pay, might be an appropriate measure of welfare for those with high ability to pay, a
social criterion might be more reasonable when valuing the welfare of the low-income patients.
Taking care of everyone may be regarded as a social norm and a value as such. In order to study
the implications of such a view, we denote the social value of a low-income patient by v > 0: A
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possible interpretation is that by providing the medication, the society can recover the ability to
work of these people. Then v can be taken to measure the social value of low-income patients in
terms of the value-added they produce in the labor market reected in their market wage12 . Such
an approach points to an interpretation that the society can regard the expenditure on the state
of health of the patients with low ability to pay as an investment.13
As there are 1 ¡ q(p; r1; 1) such patients, the Rawlsian view with social criterion introduces a
term v [1 ¡ q(p; r1; 1)] into the social welfare14. The appropriate policy target now is the maxi-
mization of the sum of the welfare of the self-paying customers and non-paying customers where
the non-paying customers obtain the pharmaceutical product with full coverage. The coverage for
the paying customers and the price of the pharmaceutical remain the optimizing variables of the
regulator. We assume that both the consumer surplus of the high-income patients and the social
value of low-income patients v [1 ¡ q(p; r1; 1)] are measured in monetary units. The aggregate value
of pharmaceutical consumption is then dened as follows:
CS(p; r1; 1) = v
Z p(1¡r1)
s
0
dw +
1Z
p(1¡r1)
s
(ws¡ (1 ¡ r1) p) dw: (61)
The other ingredients of the model are similar to those analyzed in Section 6.1, and the following
analysis also proceeds along the lines presented in that section. The following proposition displays
the Rawlsian optimal price-insurance policy with a social criterion.
Proposition 5. If ¸ > 0 and c+F > (v+s¸)=(1+2¸), the equity-adjusted optimal price-insurance
policy with a social criterion is given by
p^v = c + F (62)
and
r^v1 = 1 ¡
v + s¸
(1 + 2¸)(c+ F )
: (63)
Proof. See Appendix.
12We take that º is the average productivity. Introducing the whole distribution is possible but would only add
an unnesessary complexity in the model.
13The approach is not appropriate in the case of the high-income people as those make the investment in their
health by themselves in the model.
14 If the medication is absolutely necessary for the survival of the patient, v can alternatively be regarded as the
value of human life. The issue of the value of life has been long discussed in economics. Health care programs
are but one of the many public policy initiatives that have mortality reductions as their primary goal. The proper
social cost-benet analysis requires an estimate of the value the society places on a life saved. Evaluating the
economic value of a statistical life is now part of the generally accepted economic methodology and a large literature
has developed to estimate its (Mrozek and Taylor (2001), Viscusi (2003), Brannon (2004,2005). Economists often
estimate the value of life thus by looking at the risks that people are voluntarily willing to take, or how much they
must be paid for taking them, see also Mankiw (2012).
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The current analysis is complementary to the previous analysis with the consumer surplus as a
welfare criterion for low-income patients (see Section 6.1). When the social valuation of recovered
health is introduced to provide an alternative measure of welfare of patients with low ability to
pay, the result is rather similar to the one in the previous section but with some adjustments.
The close similarity of the results under the two alternative formulations of the social welfare
point to an emerging and rather robust view. The conict of interest between the high-income
and low-income patients depends on by how much the society values the recovered health of the
low-income patients. In particular, if the social preferences justify the regulator to impute a high
value of recovered health to patients with low ability to pay, the optimal coverage of those with
high ability to pay is reduced, ie. @r=@v < 0.
As above, we then carry out the welfare analysis. The out-of-pocket payment of the high-income
patients is given as
p^v(1 ¡ r^v1) =
v + s¸
1 + 2¸
; (64)
which is strictly increasing in the social value of recovered health v of low-income patients. The
high-income patients demand for the pharmaceutical is
q(p^v; r^v1; 1) =
µ
1 ¡ p^v(1 ¡ r^
v
1)
s
¶
=
s(1 + ¸) ¡ v
s(1 + 2¸)
; (65)
which, as expected, is decreasing in the value of the recovered health of low-income patients. The
demand of the low-income patients is given as
1 ¡ q(p^v; r^v; 1) = v + s¸
s(1 + 2¸)
: (66)
The surplus that the high-income patients receive from the consumption of the pharmaceutical
is
1Z
p(1¡r1)
s
(ws¡ (1 ¡ r1) p) dw = (s(1 + ¸) ¡ v)
2
2s(1 + 2¸)2
(67)
and the social value of the consumption of low-income patients is
v [1 ¡ q(p^v; r^v; 1)] = v (v + s¸)
s(1 + 2¸)
: (68)
By summing up the consumer surplus of the high-income patients and the social value of the
pharmaceutical consumption of the low-income patients, we obtain the aggregate value of the
pharmaceutical consumption
CS(p^v; r^v1 ; 1) =
s2(1 + ¸)2 ¡ 2sv(1 ¡ 2¸2) + (3 + 4¸) v2
2s(1 + 2¸)2
: (69)
It is worth pointing out that the consumer surplus of the high-income patients is monotonically
decreasing in the social value of pharmaceutical consumption of the low-income patients, when
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the social value of the pharmaceutical consumption of low-income patients is not too high and
v · s(1 + ¸).
The aggregate insurance expenditure is given as
IE(p^v; r^v1 ; 1) =
¡s2¸(1 + ¸) + s (1 + 2¸)2 (c + F ) + v(v ¡ s)
s(1 + 2¸)2
; (70)
which can be split into the insurance expenditure due to the consumption of high-income patients
r^v1 p^
v
µ
1 ¡ p^
v(1 ¡ r^v1)
s
¶
= maxf0; [(c+ F )(1 + 2¸) ¡ (v + s¸)] (s(1 + ¸) ¡ v)
s(1 + 2¸)2
g (71)
and the insurance expenditure due to the consumption of low-income patients
(p^v)2(1 ¡ r^v1)
s
=
(c+ F )(v + s¸)
s(1 + 2¸)
> 0: (72)
The insurance expenditure due to the consumption of the high-income patients (71) is positive
under the assumption (c + F )(1 + 2¸) > v + s¸ ensuring interior solution (see Proposition 5), if
the social value of recovered health of low-income patients is su¢ciently small and v · s(1 + ¸).
Finally, the social welfare is given as follows
W^ v =
s2(1 + ¸)2 ¡ 2s(1 + 3¸+ 2¸2)(c + F ) + v(v + 2s¸)
2s(1 + 2¸)
: (73)
The following proposition derives the conditions for the social welfare W^ v to exceed the social
welfare in a situation with a uniform insurance coverage and no equity concern for low-income
patients (see Section 5).
Proposition 6. Suppose that ¸ > 0: Then the equity-adjusted price-insurance policy (p^v; r^v1 ; 1)
with a social welfare criterion produces higher welfare than the optimal price-insurance policy (~p; ~r)
with no equity concern, that is W^ v ¸ ~W , if v ¸ c(1 + ¸), namely, if the value of the recovered
health of low-income people exceeds the social marginal cost of producing the medication.
Proof. See Appendix.
7 Final remarks
Peoples ability to pay for urgently needed pharmaceutical products varies according to their
income. Those products are created through expensive R&D programs where pharmaceutical rms
commit themselves to rather high and risky expenditures. Those expenses should subsequently be
covered by the product prices of successful new products. Such prices may indeed turn out to be
too high to be socially acceptable. The policy stance with respect to the medical products and
the insurance coverage is typically based on the purpose of providing to the citizens cost-e¢cient
pharmaceuticals of high quality at reasonable prices.
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Previous work on the optimal price regulation of pharmaceutical products and the health
insurance has produced a number of contributions. Our paper has extended the previous work in
three ways. First, we considered a market where the ability to pay di¤ers in the patient population.
Second, we made the insurance coverage endogenous and analyzed the optimal price regulation
together with the insurance coverage. Third, we examined how the optimal coverage is related to
the social cost of public funds. While most of the earlier papers have abstracted from di¤erent
abilities to pay for the pharmaceutical products, we extended our analysis to the case of the socially
optimal third-degree price discrimination. We derived an equilibrium where people with low ability
to pay have access to the full coverage while those with high ability to pay have partial coverage.
This turned out to be well motivated: the ability to pay of the high-income people is turned into
willingness to pay while this cannot hold for the low-income people. Our results are informative
in guiding decision-makers regulating the prices and the reimbursement of new pharmaceuticals.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The regulators problem is to nd the price-insurance pair (p; r) which
maximizes the social welfare
W = CS(p; r) + ¼(p; r) ¡ (1 + ¸)IE(p; r) (74)
subject to the prot constraint
¡¼(p; r) · 0 (75)
and the feasibility constraints
¡p · 0 (76)
¡r · 0 (77)
r · 1: (78)
The above problem is called the original problem, OP. In what follows, we analyze the solutions
of the original problem without the feasibility constraints. Such a problem will be called the
relaxed problem, RP. This approach to nding the solutions to the regulators problem through
the relaxed problem rests on the intuition that, if the solutions of the relaxed problems also satisfy
the feasibility constraints, then they must solve the original problem.
Let (~p; ~r) denote the price-insurance policy solving the relaxed problem and ¹ the Lagrange
multiplier of the prot constraint. The Lagrangian function of the relaxed problem can be written
as
L = CS(p; r) + (1 + ¹) ¼(p; r) ¡ (1 + ¸)IE(p; r): (79)
The solution of the relaxed problem must satisfy the rst-order conditions:
@L
@p
= ¡ (1 ¡ r)
·
1 ¡ p(1 ¡ r)
s
¸
+ (1 + ¹)
·
1 ¡ 2p(1 ¡ r)
s
+
(1 ¡ r)c
s
¸
¡ (1 + ¸) r
·
1 ¡ 2p(1 ¡ r)
s
¸
= 0 (80)
@L
@r
= p
·
1 ¡ p(1 ¡ r)
s
¸
+ (1 + ¹)(p¡ c)p
s
¡ (1 + ¸) p
·
1 ¡ p(1 ¡ r)
s
+
pr
s
¸
= 0: (81)
Moreover, the solution must satisfy the prot constraint and the complementary slackness condi-
tions ¡¼(p; r) · 0, ¹ ¸ 0 and
¹
µ
F ¡ (p¡ c)
µ
1 ¡ p(1 ¡ r)
s
¶¶
= 0: (82)
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Lemma 1. If (~p; ~r; ~¹) solves the relaxed problem, then ~¹ = ¸ ¸ 0:
Proof. Contrary to the claim suppose that ¹ 6= ¸ ¸ 0 in the solution of the relaxed problem.
Then the rst-order conditions (80) and (81) have two solutions. The rst solution is p^ = 0 and
r^ = [s¹+ c(1 +¹)]=[s¸+ c(1 +¹)], and the second solution is ·p = [s(1 +¸)¡ c(1 +¹)]=[¸¡¹] and
·r = [(s¡ c)(1 +¹)]=[s(1 + ¸) ¡ c(1 + ¹)]. When evaluated at these two solutions, the prot of the
rm is ¡¼(p^; r^) = c+ F and ¡¼(·p; ·r) = F , respectively. Therefore, the solutions of the rst-order
conditions (80) and (81) never satisfy the prot constraint. This implies that, if ¹ 6= ¸, there is
no price-insurance pair which would satisfy the necessary conditions of the relaxed problem. For
solutions to exist, we must have ¹ = ¸ ¸ 0: k
Lemma 2. If (~p; ~r; ~¹) solves the relaxed problem, then any pair (~p; ~r) satisfying
p =
s¸+ c(1 + ¸)
(1 ¡ r)(1 + 2¸) (83)
satises both rst-order conditions (80) and (81).
Proof. Suppose that (~p; ~r; ~¹) solves the relaxed problem. Then, the rst-order condition (80)
holds true, if
p =
s~¹+ c(1 + ~¹) ¡ ~r [s¸+ c(1 + ~¹)]
(1 ¡ r) [1 + 2~¹ ¡ r(1 + 2¸)] (84)
and the rst-order condition (81) is satised, if
p =
s¸+ c(1 + ~¹)
1 + ~¹+ ¸¡ ~r(1 + 2¸) or p = 0: (85)
The solution p = 0 can be ruled out, because it does not satisfy the prot constraint. By Lemma
1, the solution of the relaxed problem must satisfy ~¹ = ¸: Evaluating the right-hand sides of the
equations (84) and (85) at ~¹ = ¸ yields the equation (83). k
The rest of the proof proceeds by analyzing the cases ¸ = 0 and ¸ > 0 separately.
Part 1. Let us assume that ¸ = 0. Then, by Lemma 1 we must have ~¹ = ¸ = 0. By Lemma
2, any price-insurance pair (~p; ~r) satisfying
p =
c
1 ¡ r (86)
satises both rst-order conditions (80) and (81). Any such pair is also the solution of the relaxed
problem, if the prot constraint is satised. The prot constraint ¡¼(p; r) · 0 is satised, if
sF
sF + c(s¡ c) · r < 1: (87)
Hence any triple (~p; ~r; ~¹), which satises (86) and (87) and ~¹ = 0, is a solution candidate of the
relaxed problem. At any such solution for which the constraint (87) is not binding, the Hessian
matrix of the second derivates is indenite, because under the condition (86)
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jH2j = ¡1s2 [c¡ p(1 ¡ r)] [c¡ 3p(1 ¡ r)] = 0: (88)
This implies that no interior solution where the prot constraint is not binding and the insurance
coverage satises
sF
sF + c(s¡ c) < r (89)
can be a local maximum.
Let us then evaluate the second-order conditions of the zero-prot solution, which satises
sF
sF + c(s¡ c) = r: (90)
When the insurance coverage is (90), the optimal price is
p = c+
sF
s¡ c : (91)
When evaluated at the candidate solution, the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix is given
as
¯¯
¹H
¯¯
=
(c(s¡ c) + sF )2
s3
> 0: (92)
Hence, the zero-prot solution is a local maximum of the relaxed problem. It is also clear that the
solution satises the feasibility constraints (76), (77) and (78).
Part 2. Let us then assume that ¸ > 0. Then by Lemma 1 we must have ~¹ = ¸ > 0: By the
complementary slackness conditions the zero prot condition ¼(p; r) = 0 must then hold true at
the solution of the problem. Solving the rst-order conditions (80) and (81) together with the zero
prot condition yields the price and insurance policy and the value of the Lagrange multiplier:
~p = c +
sF
s¡ c
µ
1 + 2¸
1 + ¸
¶
(93)
~r =
sF (1 + 2¸)2 ¡ (s¡ c)2¸(1 + ¸)
(1 + 2¸) [sF (1 + 2¸) + c(s¡ c) (1 + ¸)] (94)
~¹ = ¸: (95)
When evaluated at the point (~p; ~r; ~¹), the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix is
¯¯
¹H
¯¯
=
(c(s¡ c)(1 + ¸) + sF (1 + 2¸))2
s3(1 + 2¸)
> 0; (96)
which proves that the optimal policy is a local maximum.
Let us then check that the solution of the relaxed problem satises the feasibility conditions.
It is straightforward to establish that the optimal insurance policy satises the condition ~r < 1.
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In addition, it holds true that ~r > 0 if the xed cost satises the conditions (39). And since the
optimal price ~p is strictly positive, the solution satises the feasibility conditions of the original
problem.k
Proof of Proposition 2. We rst prove that ~W ¸ WR. Dene the welfare di¤erence
DW (F ) ´ ~W ¡WR = (97)
(s¡ c)2
2s
(1 + ¸)2
1 + 2¸
¡ F (1 + ¸) ¡ 1
8s
³
s¡ c+
p
(s¡ c)2 ¡ 4sF
´2
: (98)
The rst partial derivative of the welfare di¤erence with respect to the xed cost F is given as
dDW
dF
= ¡(1 + ¸) + s¡ c+
p
(s¡ c)2 ¡ 4sF
2
p
(s¡ c)2 ¡ 4sF ; (99)
and the second partial derivative is
d2DW
(dF )2
=
s(s¡ c)³p
(s¡ c)2 ¡ 4sF
´3 > 0: (100)
Hence, the welfare di¤erence is a strictly convex function of the xed cost F . The strict convexity of
the function DW (F ) implies that the unconstrained minimum of the welfare di¤erence with respect
to the xed cost (if one exists) must be unique. Solving the rst-order condition dDW=dF = 0
with respect to F yields the minimum point
F1 =
(s¡ c)2
s
¸(1 + ¸)
(1 + 2¸)2
¸ 0; (101)
which corresponds to the inmum of the interval of the xed cost in the interior solution. This
implies that DW (F ) > DW (F1) for all values of the xed cost, which satisfy the condition (39).
When evaluated at the minimum point the value of the welfare di¤erence is zero:
DW (F1) =
(s¡ c)2
2s
(1 + ¸)2
1 + 2¸
¡ F1(1 + ¸) ¡ 1
8s
³
s¡ c+
p
(s¡ c)2 ¡ 4sF1
´2
=
(s¡ c)2
2s
µ
1 + ¸
1 + 2¸
¶2
(1 + 2¸) ¡ (s¡ c)
2
2s
µ
1 + ¸
1 + 2¸
¶2
2¸¡ (s¡ c)
2
2s
µ
1 + ¸
1 + 2¸
¶2
= 0
Hence DW (F ) > DW (F1) = 0 and ~W >WR for all interior solutions.
Secondly, we have ¹Wf ¸ ~W when
(s¡ c)2
2s
¡ F ¸ (s¡ c)
2
2s
(1 + ¸)2
(1 + 2¸)
¡ F (1 + ¸); (102)
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which implies that
(s¡ c)2
2s
¸
1 + 2¸
· F: (103)
But now
(s¡ c)2
2s
¸
1 + 2¸
=
(s¡ c)2
2s
¸(1 + 2¸)
(1 + 2¸)2
<
(s¡ c)2
2s
2¸(1 + ¸)
(1 + 2¸)2
; (104)
where the last expression corresponds to the inmum of the set of xed costs inducing the optimal
price-insurance solution to be interior. Hence, the condition (103) is satised as a strict inequality
in the interior solution (with conditions 39), if ¸ > 0. If ¸ = 0 and the solution is interior, then the
optimal price-insurance pair induces the e¢cient consumption and production of pharmaceuticals
and we have ~W = ¹Wf . k
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that ¸ > 0: As above in the proof of Proposition 1, we will
concentrate on solving the relaxed problem. The Lagrangian function of the relaxed problem is
given as follows
L = CS(p; r1; 1) + (1 + ¹)¼(p; r1; 1) ¡ (1 + ¸)IE(p; r1; 1); (105)
where the consumer surplus, the rms prot and the insurance expenditure are dened in (48),
(49) and (50). The consumer surplus and the insurance expenditure simplify to
CS(p; r1; 1) =
s
2
¡ p(1 ¡ r1) + p
2(1 ¡ r1)2
s
(106)
and
IE(p; r1; 1) = r1p+
p2(1 ¡ r1)2
s
: (107)
The solution of the relaxed problem must satisfy the rst-order conditions:
@L
@p
= ¹¡ ¸
·
r1 +
2p(1 ¡ r1)2
s
¸
= 0 (108)
@L
@r1
= ¡¸p
·
1 ¡ 2p(1 ¡ r1)
s
¸
= 0 (109)
Moreover, the solution must satisfy the prot constraint and complementary slackness conditions
¡¼(p; r1; 1) · 0, ¹ ¸ 0 and
¹ (F + c¡ p) = 0: (110)
We can ignore the solutions in which p = 0, because such solutions do not satisfy the prot
constraint.
Lemma 1 ¹^ = ¸.
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Proof. Suppose rst that ¸ > 0: Then from the rst-order condition (109) we obtain
2p(1 ¡ r1)
s
= 1: (111)
Substituting this condition into the (108), we have ¹^ = ¸ > 0. If ¸ = 0, then by the rst-order
condition (108) we have ¹ = 0. Therefore ¹ = ¸.k
By Lemma 1 and assumption ¸ > 0 we have ¹^ = ¸ > 0. The optimal price is p^ = c+F by the
condition (110). Substituting the optimal price into the condition (111) yields
r^1 = 1 ¡ s
2(c+ F )
: (112)
The optimal insurance coverage is strictly positive, if c+F > s=2. When evaluated at the solution
of the problem, the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix is
¯¯
¹H
¯¯
=
2(c+ F )2¸
s
> 0; (113)
which demonstrates that the solution is a local maximum. The solution satises the feasibility
constraints p ¸ 0 and 0 · r1 · 1 and, therefore, solves the original problem.k
Proof of Proposition 4. Now ~W · W^ , if
(s¡ c)2
2s
(1 + ¸)2
1 + 2¸
¡ F (1 + ¸) · s
4
(2 + ¸) ¡ (1 + ¸)(c+ F ) (114)
which simplies to the inequality
s2
µ
¸
2
¶
¡ 2sc¸(1 + ¸) ¡ c2(1 + ¸)2 ¸ 0: (115)
The above inequality holds true, if s ¸ 2c(1+¸)[1+p1 + 1=(2¸) or if s · 2c(1+¸)[1¡p1 + 1=(2¸).
Since the lower root requires a strictly negative-valued quality s violating Assumption 1, we have
~W · W^ , if s ¸ 2c(1 + ¸)[1 + p1 + 1=(2¸).k
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that ¸ > 0. The Lagrangian function of the relaxed
problem is (105) except that now the consumer surplus is given as
CS(p; r1; 1) =
vp(1 ¡ r1)
s
+
1Z
p(1¡r)
s
(ws¡ (1 ¡ r) p) dw: (116)
The solution of the relaxed problem must satisfy the rst-order conditions:
@L
@p
=
v(1 ¡ r1)
s
¡ (1 ¡ r1)
·
1 ¡ p(1 ¡ r1)
s
¸
+ (1 + ¹) ¡ (1 + ¸)
·
r1 +
2p(1 ¡ r1)2
s
¸
= 0 (117)
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and
@L
@r
=
¡vp
s
+ p
·
1 ¡ p(1 ¡ r1)
s
¸
¡ (1 + ¸) p
·
1 ¡ 2p(1 ¡ r1)
s
¸
= 0: (118)
The solution of the relaxed problem must also satisfy the prot constraint and the complementary
slackness conditions ¡¼(p; r1; 1) · 0, ¹ ¸ 0 and
¹ (F + c¡ p) = 0: (119)
Lemma 1. The solution of the relaxed problem satises ¹^ = ¸ ¸ 0:
Proof. Contrary to the claim suppose that ¹ 6= ¸ ¸ 0 in the solution of the relaxed problem.
Then the rst-order conditions (117) and (118) hold true simultaneously only when p^ = 0 and
r^1 = [s¹ + v]=[s¸ + v]. At this point the rms prot is ¡¼(p^; r^1) = c + F > 0 and therefore, we
have no solution, which would satisfy the necessary conditions of the problem, if ¹ 6= ¸. For a
solution to exist, we must have ¹ = ¸ ¸ 0.k
Lemma 2 If (p^; r^1; ¹^) solves the relaxed problem, then any pair (p^; r^1) satisfying
p =
s¸+ v
(1 ¡ r1)(1 + 2¸) (120)
satises both rst-order conditions conditions (117) and (118).
Proof. Suppose that (p^; r^1; ¹^) solves the relaxed problem. Then the rst-order condition (80)
holds true, if
p =
s(¹^ ¡ r1¸) + v(1 ¡ r1)
(1 ¡ r1)2 (1 + 2¸) (121)
and the rst-order condition (81) is satised if
p =
s¸+ v
(1 ¡ r1)(1 + 2¸) or p = 0: (122)
The case p = 0 can be ruled out because that solution never satises the prot constraint. By
Lemma 1, the solution of the relaxed problem must satisfy ¹^ = ¸. Evaluating the right-hand side
of the equation (121) at ~¹ = ¸ yields the equation (120). k
Let us then assume that ¸ > 0: Then ¹^ = ¸ > 0; and the optimal price is p^v = c + F by the
zero-prot condition. This solution together with the condition (120) yields the optimal insurance:
r^v1 = 1 ¡
s¸+ v
(1 + 2¸)(c+ F )
: (123)
The optimal insurance coverage is strictly positive, if c+ F > (s¸+ v)=(1 + 2¸). At the solution,
the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix is
¯¯
¹H
¯¯
=
(c + F )2(1 + 2¸)
s
> 0; (124)
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which shows that the solution is a local maximum. The solution also satises the feasibility
constraints.k
Proof of Proposition 6. Now ~W · W^ v if
(s¡ c)2
2s
(1 + ¸)2
(1 + 2¸)
¡ F (1 + ¸) · s
2(1 + ¸)2 ¡ 2s(1 + 3¸+ 2¸2)(c + F ) + v(v + 2s¸)
2s(1 + 2¸)
(125)
which, after some straightforward computation, simplies to the inequality
v2 + 2¸sv ¡ c(1 + ¸)[c(1 + ¸) + 2¸s] ¸ 0: (126)
The above inequality holds true if v ¸ c(1 + ¸) or if v · ¡(c(1 + ¸) + 2s¸): Since negative values
of the parameter v are not feasible, we have ~W · W^ v, if v ¸ c(1 + ¸): k
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